End-to-End AES Encryption Workflow
Encrypt sensitive data with AES-256-GCM, encode output for transmission, and generate secure random passwords.
Overview
When you need to encrypt sensitive strings for storage or transmission, using AES-256-GCM with proper key derivation is the gold standard. This workflow covers encryption, encoding for safe transmission, and generating the cryptographically strong passwords needed for secure key material.
Step-by-Step Implementation
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Quick Summary
Encrypt a string locally with AES-256-GCM: generate a 32-char random passphrase, encrypt with PBKDF2 key derivation (100k+ iterations) and a random IV, then Base64-encode the ciphertext+salt+IV blob for safe transmission. Symmetric, fast, authenticated.
Key Takeaways
- AES-256-GCM provides confidentiality *and* authenticity in one pass, preferred over AES-CBC + HMAC.
- Always use a fresh random IV per encryption, reusing an IV with GCM is catastrophic (key compromise).
- PBKDF2 with 100,000+ iterations (or Argon2id) is required when deriving keys from passwords.
- Pack `salt | IV | ciphertext | authTag` into one Base64 blob, the decryptor needs all four.
- For data at rest, prefer envelope encryption (KMS-managed DEK + per-record data key) over raw AES.
When to use it
- Encrypting sensitive config values before storing in a public Git repo (use sops/age in real systems).
- Demonstrating end-to-end encryption to stakeholders during a security review.
- Sharing a one-time secret with a colleague via a URL when out-of-band channels aren't available.
- Encrypting fields client-side before persisting to a third-party storage backend.
Common Mistakes
- Using a constant or low-entropy IV, breaks GCM's security guarantees completely.
- Using ECB mode (the 'default' in some libraries), patterns in plaintext appear in ciphertext.
- Skipping PBKDF2/Argon2 and hashing the password with SHA-256 once, too fast, brute-forceable.
- Forgetting to authenticate associated data (AAD) when GCM supports it for binding ciphertext to context.
End-to-End AES Encryption Workflow, Frequently Asked
AES-GCM vs AES-CBC, which should I use?
GCM. It's authenticated (detects tampering) and parallelizable. CBC requires a separate HMAC step that developers frequently get wrong (padding oracle attacks, etc.).
Is 100,000 PBKDF2 iterations enough in 2026?
OWASP currently recommends 600,000 for SHA-256 PBKDF2. Better still: switch to Argon2id with memory cost ≥ 19MB and 2+ iterations.
Can I derive multiple keys from one password?
Yes, use HKDF after PBKDF2/Argon2 with different `info` parameters to derive distinct keys for encryption, MAC, etc. Don't reuse the raw KDF output for multiple purposes.